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Response to Knepper
JOHN HICK
Institute for Advanced Research in Arts and Social Sciences, University of Birmingham,
Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT
e-mail: j.h.hick@bham.ac.uk
Abstract: Having cited Dionysius as one of the many Christian thinkers who aﬃrm
the ineﬀability, or transcategoriality, of God in God’s ultimate inner being, I respond
to Timothy D. Knepper’s claim that this is a mistake. Whilst accepting much that he
says about Dionysius, I still prefer the standard interpretation of the Dionysian texts
as teaching the total transcategoriality of the Transcendent as ‘surpassing all
discourse and all knowledge’.
Most readers of this paper will probably not have read my article
‘Ineﬀability’ of nine years ago.1 I should explain that only two and a half of its
twelve pages are about Dionysius. He is one of the many thinkers whom I cite to
illustrate the fact that the distinction between, on the one hand, the Ultimate in
itself, which is transcategorial, and on the other hand its impingements on
human consciousness, is found in all the main religious traditions. This is mainly
in their mystical streams, where we ﬁnd what BernardMcGinn calls, in the case of
Dionysius, his ‘fundamental distinction between God hidden and God revealed’.2
It is in the course of this that I discuss some Christian theologians who stress the
ineﬀability of God in His ultimate being: Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Pseudo-
Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, Margaret
Porete, down to Paul Tillich, Gordon Kaufman, and Ninian Smart.
Timothy D. Knepper does not attack religious pluralism, but wants to drop
Dionysius from the list of thinkers who aﬃrm the ultimate transcategoriality, or
ineﬀability, of the Ultimate. He presents his new interpretation of Dionysius’
texts in terms of what he claims to be three misuses.3
The ﬁrst misuse, according to Knepper, is to hold that that the divine names are
not literally true of God, the misuse arising from a failure to distinguish between
the intelligible and the perceptible names. Knepper believes that whilst the for-
mer (lower-case divine names) are metaphorical the latter (upper-case DIVINE
NAMES) are causal powers which give their nature to all ﬁnite beings. Let us agree
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that the DIVINE NAMES are not metaphors. (I did not suggest that they are.) But
the essential point remains that God transcends, is hyper to, them. On the one
hand, Knepper says that ‘the hyper being God cannot be absolutely and un-
qualiﬁedly transcategorial ’, but on the other hand he holds that ‘God does
not participate in the DIVINE NAMES’ (208) but transcends them. And so,
‘Dionysius can therefore deny both the DIVINE NAMES and the divine names
of God’ (209). Surely, then, God is absolutely and unqualiﬁedly transcategorial.
As Donald Duclow says, ‘Dionysius emphasizes the dissimilarities in sensible
symbols and the limits of all intelligible divine names. His workMystical Theology
negates all language about God because divinity cannot be known in its trans-
cendence’.4
In fact, in my article I do not discuss the nature of the divine names/DIVINE
NAMES. It is not these that I claim to bemetaphorical according to Dionysius, but
biblical language. The relevance of this to divine ineﬀability is that Dionysius is
responding to the contradiction between saying ‘that the Godhead is absolutely
ineﬀable, transcending all our human categories of thought’, and ‘that the
Godhead is self-revealed in the Bible as a trinity, one person of whom became
incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth’.5 Dionysius is rare among the theologians in that
he is well aware of this problem, and confronts it directly. As I say in the article,
His answer is that the language of scripture is metaphorical : ‘ the Word of God makes
use of poetic imagery … as a concession to the nature of our own minds’ ; the divine
Light make truth known to us ‘by way of representative symbols’ … . Dionysius uses
‘symbolic’ with the same meaning as ‘metaphorical’. He emphasizes the
metaphorical character of the biblical language by pointing to the absurdity of taking
it literally.6
Denys Turner, in The Darkness of God, also and for the same reason equates
Dionysius’ symbols with metaphors.7
Knepper’s second misuse is to hold that ‘Negation of divine names states their
literal falsity of God’ (209). Again, I agree. I said that, according to Dionysius,
the divine names do not apply to God in God’s ultimate transcendence either
positively or negatively. He says that God ‘is beyond privations, beyond every
denial, beyond every assertion’.8 This is a more radical position than that the
divine names are not literally true of God. They are not literally true, or literally
false, because they do not apply to God at all.
However, Knepper holds that Dionysius attributes the divine names to God
‘pre-eminently rather than privatively … it conveys God’s possession of these
names in some mysteriously superabundant sense’ (209). As well as ‘super-
abundant’ and ‘pre-eminently’ Knepper also uses the term ‘unknowable excess’.
‘God is the divine names in a mysteriously superabundant sense insofar as God
gives substance to the DIVINE NAMES’ (212). The text, he says, strongly suggests
this. He admits that the outcome of his interpretation ‘may seem hopelessly
vague’ (212). This seems to me to be its problem.
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Nevertheless, Knepper’s interpretation may be correct: God may in some un-
intelligible way have these attributes in some unspeciﬁed ‘pre-eminent’ sense. In
that case God cannot, according to Dionysius, be totally transcategorial, though
the sense in which he has attributes remains mysterious. But I ﬁnd it hard to
accept an interpretation which hinges upon an idea that cannot be made clear.
I prefer the standard understanding of Dionysius as teaching the total trans-
categoriality of God in God’s ultimate nature.
In the end Knepper says, ‘ if Dionysius does claim that God is in some sense
‘‘ transcategorial ’’, he does so in a particular way and from a particular per-
spective’ (216). Of course. As Knepper himself points out, all thinking has this
character. He adds that ‘if Dionysius does claim that God is in some sense
‘‘ transcategorial ’’, he does not do so by drawing upon the contemporary category
of transcategoriality ’ (217). But although Dionysius uses diﬀerent language,
the contemporary sense of transcategoriality or ineﬀability does seem to me to
correspond with what he says: ‘ the Transcendent surpasses all discourse and
all knowledge. It abides beyond the realm of mind and of being. … escaping
from any perception, imagination, opinion, discourse, apprehension, or under-
standing’.9
Knepper’s third alleged misuse is that ‘Negation of divine names is not the sole
or ultimate means by which humans are saved or divinized’ (213). He apparently
assumes that to point to Dionysius’ statements that the scriptural symbols of God
serve as useful means for uplifting souls, is to assert that for Dionysius this is the
sole or ﬁnal means of salvation, to the exclusion of the Church and its rituals. But
this is a mistaken assumption. Dionysius had a high view of the Church, although
it is not one that I share.
Coming now to Knepper’s ﬁnal section, I am not doing comparative theology
but philosophy of religion – which stands back from all religious commitments
(whatever commitment the philosopher may personally have) and, in my case,
seeks a ﬁeld theory of religion globally. It seems to me that this requires the
concept of the Ultimate Reality, or the Real ; its total transcategoriality ; and the
consequent distinction between the Real in itself and the Real as varyingly human
perceived. I ﬁnd the ﬁrst two of these in Dionysius, but not the third, in that he
never considered the status of religions other than his own. For Dionysius the
Ultimate Reality is the God of Christianity.
But whether Knepper is right or not, the pluralistic hypothesis – that the great
religions are diﬀerent human responses, in their diﬀerent culturally determined
forms, to the same ultimate transcendent reality, which is itself transcategorial –
remains unaﬀected.
However, Knepper’s problem with the pluralistic hypothesis is that it con-
centrates as similarities and overlooks diﬀerences. He says, correctly, that my ‘use
of the Kantian phenomenal should provide for an appreciation of religious dif-
ference’ (217). And it does. It enables us to see each in its unique individuality,
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as very diﬀerent human responses, each formed within a diﬀerent historical and
cultural context, to the one divine noumenon. It leaves the religions as they are,
except that it requires each to come to accept that it is not the one and only true
faith, and so to gradually ﬁlter out any doctrines which entail that it is. It is true
that all this does not come in the article on ‘Ineﬀability’, which was about one
particular aspect of the hypothesis. But my An Interpretation of Religion includes
a very full account of the diﬀerences between the religions.10 Taking account of
religious diﬀerences is not an alternative to pluralism but part of it.
Finally, Knepper says that ‘the Dionysian corpus does not stand witness to
the metaphorization of all religious beliefs, the absolute transcategorization of
ultimacy, and the ultilization of all religious practices’ (217). I agree with this
on two of the three counts. Dionysius does not say that all religious beliefs are
metaphorical, and the only one that I have myself treated as metaphorical is the
concept of divine incarnation. Whether Dionysius taught the absolute trans-
categoriality of the ultimate is the question at issue in Knepper’s article. He
argues that Dionysius did not teach this. Most scholars who have written about
Dionysius think that he did, and I am inclined to follow them. And Dionysius did
treat religious practices, particularly ecclesiastical rituals, as useful means, as well
as our use of the scriptures. Here I go further than Dionysius. I see all religious
practices as ‘skilful means’ of spiritual development, opening us to the Tran-
scendent.
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